Stephen Pinker at times seems to think it could never, in principle, be done. He is right to say that no one wants to be an elimitavist and shows that on paradigm accounts the work is all up hill. The central argument of this paper is that the Objectivist atheological argument based on the primacy of existence fails. At the time of publication, to my knowledge, it was the only book-length attempt written from a theistic perspective to examine the issue of whether or not sui generis consciousness provides a significant defeater for naturalism and substantial evidence for theism. I was privileged to have neuropsychologist-theologian James Ashbrook on my dissertation committee. What science tells us about the mind points strongly towards some version or other of physicalism. He concludes that Augustine's argument is valid, having given many different reasons why Platonism, its primary premise, is true.
Moreland spends much of the book defending this premise against philosophers, such as , who accept pluralist naturalism. Philip Clayton and pluralistic emergentist monism 8. For the naturalist, evidence of the kind that Moreland would like them to admit sounds too much like evidence for the existence of fairies. The Catholic philosopher , whilst he feels that it could be an effective argument, feels that we have too little knowledge of the workings of consciousness for this to be truly convincing as of yet. In chapters three through seven, I analyze and criticize the top representative of rival approaches to explaining the origin of consciousness. Moreland Biola University comments on the nature of consciousness, suggesting that consciousness is immaterial, ultimately finding its origin in God.
Atheological arguments based on the alleged incoherence of the Divine attributes are at best inconclusive. He suggests that the most probable way in which the non-physical and the physical are linked in causal-interaction is by design- which implies a designer. Moreland is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Biola University. Accordingly, he or she may claim that while possible, scientific evidence has made substance or emergent property dualism untenable. Moreover, he analyzes and criticizes the top representative of rival approaches to explaining the origin of consciousness, including John Searle's contingent correlation, Timothy O'Connor's emergent necessitation, Colin Mc Ginn's mysterian ''naturalism, '' David Skrbina's panpsychism and Philip Clayton's pluralistic emergentist monism.
His response is wildly inept. In Consciousness and the Existence of God, J. A large number, perhaps the majority, of philosophical naturalists e. I dedicated to my colleague and dear friend, William Lane Craig, because of his love for God, his fidelity to truth and his dedication to the defense of the knowledge of God for all peoples. If any reader has bothered to read it and found some gold among the dross, feel free to call our attention to it in the combox below.
He has co-planted three churches, spoken and debated on over 175 college campuses around the country, and served with Campus Crusade for Christ for 10 years. This, Moreland argues, is tantamount to stealing the work of the theist. For eight years, he served as a bioethicist for PersonaCare Nursing Homes, Inc. He has four earned degrees: a B. His inclusion of the argument led to an extremely critical review of his book on the existence of God to be published by. But these facts are inexplicable from a naturalistic standpoint, and they are radically sui generis compared to all other entities in the naturalist ontology. Theism has not been shown to be incompatible with Objectivism.
The argument was influenced by. He also critiques contemporary philosophers of mind such as , , , , and , who attempt to account for consciousness. Curiously, these two trends—the explosion in philosophy of religion and the growing importance of clarifying the relationship between naturalism and the resurgence of emergent property dualism—are taking place largely in a sort of bibliographical isolation from each other; scholars are not interacting with these trends as they could. Moreland argues that what drives strong naturalism is fear of God. Moreland is willing to recognize that the impasse is reached at this point and is hard pushed to find more resources to breach it. In chapters three through seven, I analyze and criticize the top representative of rival approaches to explaining the origin of consciousness.
P Moreland argues that irreducible human consciousness provides compelling evidence for the existence of God. However, Moreland maintains that questioning these minor premises is of little consolation to the naturalist as they essentially constitute intramural theist debates, and that for most westerners theism is the only viable candidate to accommodate personal explanations. At the time of publication, to my knowledge, it was the only book-length attempt written from a theistic perspective to examine the issue of whether or not sui generis consciousness provides a significant defeater for naturalism and substantial evidence for theism. I would also like to see theists develop the argument more fully and employ it more in their work. Part of that evidence consists in providing some new insights into the Knowledge Argument and into issues surrounding intentionality that favor at least property dualism. It does not meet the standards of evidence accepted by methodological naturalism.
Moreover, he analyzes and criticizes the top representative of rival approaches to explaining the origin of consciousness, including John Searle's cont In Consciousness and the Existence of God, J. The intuitions, in one way or another, suggest that there is something seriously incomplete about any purely physical story about the mind. To postulate mental properties on a physicalist ontology appears ad hoc and implausible. I believe that this book has the potential to open new territory of consideration, especially as more philosophers realize the relationship between finite consciousness and broader worldview considerations, including the interface between the two trends mentioned above. Moreland - Moreland - J. I dedicated to my colleague and dear friend, William Lane Craig, because of his love for God, his fidelity to truth and his dedication to the defense of the knowledge of God for all peoples.
Moreland argues against philosophical naturalism atheism and for the existence of God via mind-body dualism supernaturalism. Moreland takes the arguments for the first premise and refers to classic defenses of dualism. I am not clear how a theistic ontology that supports an immaterial soul is particularly Christian. It seems, for an argument reliant upon background evidence, if the naturalist allows theistic evidence, and thus admitting arguments like the Kalam argument, then the naturalist is in a much poorer position. The upshot of chapter one is that the inner logic of naturalism places a severe burden of proof on those naturalists who would embrace certain kinds of emergent properties. Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument—J. I hope to introduce philosophers of religion to issues in philosophy of mind with which they often do not address and to introduce philosophers of mind, especially naturalists, with the way topics in philosophy of religion inform their area of reflection.
John Searle and contingent correlation 4. In chapters six and seven, I consider views that I claim are not plausibly taken to be versions of positive naturalism: David Skrbina and panpsychism chapter six and Philip Clayton and pluralistic emergentist monism chapter seven. God Is the Best Explanation of Intentional States of Consciousness In the World—William Lane Craig. He says that whilst this argument, owing to its inductive form, is inconclusive, it does provide strong evidence for a God. Moreland combines this with an able defense of dualism, from introspection, personal identity, first person indexicality, libertarian free will, and identity conditions. Moreover, he analyzes and criticizes the top representative of rival approaches to explaining the origin of consciousness, including John Searle's contingent correlation, Timothy O'Connor's emergent necessitation, Colin McGinn's mysterian ''naturalism, '' David Skrbina's panpsychism and Philip Clayton's pluralistic emergentist monism.